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All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'What is a Law of Nature?' and 'Dialogue on Things and Words'

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73 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz]
True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]